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Article 3

DEFENDING DEFERENCE: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR
SYLVAIN’S DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE
ZAHR K. SAID *
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO AEREO
In Disruption and Deference, 1 Professor Olivier Sylvain offers a
thorough analysis of one of the most important copyright cases of our era,
ABC v. Aereo, 2 a case already beginning to spawn a great volume of
responses in the legal literature and destined to be a lynchpin of copyright
jurisprudence in the area of innovative technologies. During the lead-up to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo, many important questions of media
policy swirled around in the discussion of the case’s possible impact. There
were pundits and lobbyists worrying that it might represent the “end [of]
TV as we know it,” if Aereo’s services were found non-infringing. 3 There
was a great deal of hand-wringing over the possibility that if technologies
designed to follow the Copyright Act to the letter were found infringing,
innovation would be detrimentally chilled.4 Some wondered whether Aereo
would represent a turning-point for copyright law, a sanction of engineering
that existed to exploit technical loopholes in copyright law, that is, what, in
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1. Olivier Sylvain, Disruption and Deference, 74 MD. L. REV. 715 (2015).
2. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
3. See, e.g., Tom Ashbrook, The Supreme Court on Aereo and the Future of TV, ON POINT
(Apr. 23, 2014), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2014/04/23/aereo-cord-cutting-tv-scotus; Joshua
Brustein, Aereo’s Day in Court Won’t End TV as We Know It, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-04-21/aereos-supreme-court-showdown-wont-endtv-as-we-know-it; Cecelia Kang & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Decide on Aereo, Obscure
Start-up That Could Reshape the TV Industry, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/aereo-case-goes-tosupremecourt/2014/04/21/50bbd1e8-c59d-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html; Brendan Sasso,
Is the Supreme Court Preparing to End TV as We Know It?, NAT’L JURIST (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/technology/is-the-supreme-court-preparing-to-end-tv-as-weknow-it-20140110.
4. See, e.g., Scott Bomboy, Cloud Computing Is the Plot Twist in the Aereo TV Case,
CONST. DAILY (Apr. 23, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/04/cloud-computing-isthe-plot-twist-in-the-aereo-tv-case/; Adam Liptak, Justices Skeptical of Aereo’s Business, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/business/media/supreme-court-hearsarguments-in-aereo-case.html?_r=0; Mike Masnick, The Aereo Case Isn’t About Aereo, but About
the Future of Cloud Computing and Innovation, TECHDIRT (Mar. 6, 2014),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140306/00350726450/aereo-case-isnt-about-aereo-aboutfuture-cloud-computing-innovation.shtml.
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his dissent from the Second Circuit’s opinion, Judge Denny Chin referred to
disdainfully as a “Rube Goldberg-like contrivance,” 5 and what Professor
Dan Burk has called, more optimistically, “inventing around” the law. 6 The
Second Circuit’s holding in Aereo seemed to still others like the natural—
though perverse—extension of the Second Circuit’s holding in Cartoon
Network (hereinafter, Cablevision), 7 and some speculation concerned
whether that latter case would fall, or be bolstered, by Aereo. 8 Finally, it
was unclear whether and how Aereo might reshape the future of the public
performance right in copyright law, a provision which had never been
before the Supreme Court. 9 The Court’s decision did not answer all of
these questions decisively, 10 but it did reverse the Ninth Circuit’s holding
that Aereo was not infringing. 11 In so doing, it set in motion a new set of
questions about the scope of its holding and (despite the Court’s attempts to
craft a holding that would not implicate other technologies) 12 the risks
posed by cloud computing. 13 Happily for court-watchers, Professor Sylvain
has weighed into the fray to assess Aereo’s impact at the intersection of
three crucial fields of media policy: copyright law, administrative law, and
telecommunications law.
Professor Sylvain’s coverage of Aereo is thus excellent as an
introduction to the case itself. First, he reminds readers of how
5. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) and rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
6. Dan Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 64, 64 (2014),
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2014/09/inventing-around-copyright.html.
7. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2008). The case is commonly referred to as “Cablevision” because CSC stands for Cablevision
Systems Corporation and the product is better known under the brand name (Cablevision) than the
entity name (CSC).
8. Jane C. Ginsburg, WNET v. Aereo: The Second Circuit Persists in Poor (Cable)Vision,
THE MEDIA INST. (Apr. 23, 2013), www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2013/042313.php.
9. Vivian I. Kim, The Public Performance Right in the Digital Age: Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 263, 296 (2009).
10. Matthew Sag, The Uncertain Scope of the Public Performance Right After American
Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc., MATTHEW SAG: COPYRIGHT LAW, FAIR USE AND
TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 18, 2014), http://matthewsag.com/?p=1160.
11. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc.,
712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 896 (2014) and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2498 (2014).
12. Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2510. But see id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Amanda Asaro, Stay Tuned: Whether Cloud-Based Service Providers Can Have Their
Copyrighted Cake and Eat It Too, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107 (2014); Cecelia Kang, Justices Test
Aereo on Copyright Issue but Raise Concerns About Harming Cloud Services, WASH. POST (Apr.
22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/justices-test-aereo-on-copyrightissue-but-raise-concern-aboutharming-cloud-services/2014/04/22/1035912a-ca40-11e3-93eb6c0037dde2ad_story.html.
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anachronistic the Copyright Act’s Transmit Clause is in an era of radically
changed media consumption. 14 He concludes that the drafting Congress did
not foresee 15 (and I would add, could not have foreseen) contemporary
consumption and transmission practices. 16 Second, he offers detailed
analysis of the trajectory of the legal fight over online video distribution,
centering on Aereo but situating it in the larger landscape of prior and
concurrent cases that included FilmOn, Cablevision, and others. 17 He
helpfully revisits Aereo’s technological architecture in a simplified and
accessible way. 18 He concludes by analyzing the dispute between Justice
Breyer, who wrote the Aereo majority, and Justice Scalia, who dissented, as
a proxy for their disagreement over interpretive politics. This approach is a
clear-sighted way to frame what takes place, on the surface, as a debate
If his article’s
about copyright and telecommunications policy. 19
contributions had ceased there, it would still be worth the reader’s time
simply for the understanding of Aereo the article provides.
II. THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
However, Professor Sylvain’s article is noteworthy less for what he
highlights within the opinion and more for what he reveals is absent from it.
One of Sylvain’s perhaps tongue-in-cheek subheadings is “Agency Work
(or, What the Aereo Opinions Did Not Mention).” 20 The article
14. Sylvain, supra note 1, at 722 n.18 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 101, defining the public
performance right under 17 U.S.C. § 106 “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or
display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of
the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. Id. at 718.
16. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Aereo, Disruptive Technology, and Statutory
Interpretation (June 26, 2014) (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2459312, 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459312.
17. Sylvain, supra note 1, at 722–27.
18. Id. at 724.
19. Id. at 730–32. Sylvain joins a group of other voices addressing the jurisprudential
questions lying below the surface of Aereo. See, e.g., Andrew Tutt, Textualism and the Equity of
the Copyright Act: Reflections Inspired by American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc., 89
ONLINE
1
(2014),
N.Y.U.
L.
REV.
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/nyulawreviewonline-89-1-tutt.pdf; Menell &
Nimmer, supra note 16, at 1 (“The Aereo case presented two fundamental showdowns: one
between the cable industry and a charismatic disruptive technology and the other between
textualists and jurists seeking to vindicate legislative intent.”); Michael Dorf, Technology and
Methodology
in
Aereo
and
Riley,
DORF ON
LAW
(June
26,
2014),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/06/technology-and-methodology-in-aereo-and.html
(“[T]he
lineup in Aereo is best understood as reflecting purposivist versus textualist sympathies on the
Court.”).
20. Sylvain, supra note 1, at 734.
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demonstrates conclusively, to my mind, that courts remained oddly silent
on the question of their authority to interpret the Copyright Act. That is,
they skipped what Sylvain tells his reader is known informally as a
“Chevron Step Zero,” or an inquiry into “whether Congress has one way or
another delegated to the agency at issue the authority to interpret and
administer an ambiguous provision with the ‘force of law.’” 21 If Congress
has done so, Chevron analysis allows courts to determine whether agency
judgments will control or what role they will play short of controlling. 22 In
an area of law presenting novel legal questions in consequence of
constantly emerging technologies, where Sylvain persuasively shows that
agencies have been extremely active, it is remarkable that courts did not, at
a minimum, discuss the question of their own interpretive authority relative
to the executive branch. Hence Sylvain has raised the specter of
administrative law and posed a pair of crucial questions: why did courts
choose not to rely on existing agency rulings, and why did they choose not
to discuss their authority even if they planned not to defer to agencies here?
In light of existing agency rulings that could have been relied on in the
Aereo litigation, but appear to have been systematically overlooked, Aereo
reflects important choices about the scope of judicial deference to the
executive branch. In Sylvain’s telling, Aereo is a compelling story about
diffident—or perhaps hubristic—judicial decisionmaking in which judges
repeatedly chose to make law rather than defer to expertise. Consequently,
the key piece of Sylvain’s account of Aereo is the intersection of copyright
law with administrative law. His is a rare piece of scholarship displaying
expertise across three different legal terrains—copyright law, administrative
law, and telecommunications law—each one highly complex, and usually
insufficiently travelled by most scholars in the other fields.
The article left me with a few unanswered questions that this review
will offer up in the spirit of engagement with a very fine piece of work that
leaves its reader wanting more. First, what accounts for the judicial silence
on the proper authority to assess disruptive technologies? And why the
silence, now? How could courts be remaining silent on the question of their
proper interpretive authority, given the clear congressional delegation of
authority to the Copyright Office and the FCC over their respective
legislation, in the context of new technologies? 23 After reading Disruption
and Deference, it seems almost incredible that courts would maintain
silence in the face of what appears to be a clear, and unavoidable, legal
question to address. Some hints at why and how would clarify the article’s
implications. Along those lines, Sylvain’s article raised pressing questions
21. Id. at 769 (quoting United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 229 (2001)).
22. Id. at 769–70.
23. Id. at 762–63.
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about the role judicial philosophies play in case outcomes and reasoning. It
seemed at times that Sylvain’s commitment to proceduralism needed some
bolstering, or at least further exploration as a stated commitment, given
what might broadly be styled as a default to consequentialism in the legal
academy, especially among IP academics.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Sylvain quickly convinced me that administrative law questions
lurked, unattended to, in the Aereo litigation, leaving me wondering why.
Disruptive technologies have long featured in copyright law’s thorniest
problems. 24 Are they somehow harder now than they once were? Is there,
normatively, a sound policy reason for treating technological questions
differently in the administrative law scheme? Is it that interpreting the
Copyright Act is somehow exceptional? (And if so, why?) Or more
broadly, are technological questions in need of different treatment under the
law given the unique risks that innovators take, or the public benefit that
technologies are capable of delivering? What makes a technology
disruptive, and how should the benefits of their disruptions be
Is Sylvain identifying an area of technological
determined? 25
exceptionalism with respect to the separation of powers?
Especially given earlier judicial reticence to act in this area, before
Congress had expressly spoken, 26 it seems difficult to understand
independent judicial actions in this area after Congress had made its
position clearer, both through amendments to the Copyright Act, and
through clear delegations of power to agencies, not judges.27 Sylvain
makes us aware of a legal puzzle, but does not offer to lead us all the way
through it.
For instance, it is unclear in the article whether judges faced with
disruptive technologies are deciding the kinds of questions posed in Aereo
because they see issues they would like to decide and believe they possess

24. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010) (“Copyright
law’s confrontation with evolving technology has been a near-constant theme since Congress
enacted its first copyright law in 1790.” (citing Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124)); see
also Burk, supra note 6, at 5.
25. Sylvain does not explicitly define disruptiveness, though implicitly it would seem he
means communicative technologies that present themselves “as the modern-day alternative to the
greedy old incumbents.” Sylvain, supra note 1, at 726.
26. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 401 (1968) (“We have
been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae brief to render a compromise decision in
this case that would, it is said, accommodate various competing considerations of copyright,
communications, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for Congress.”
(footnote call numbers omitted)).
27. Sylvain, supra note 1, at 731.
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the authority to do so, or because they believe they are the interpreters of
last resort. At times, Sylvain characterizes judges as though they believe
they may decide such questions, and at other times, as though they must
decide them. 28 The characterization matters, and a more robust explanation
would be helpful for the reader in understanding Sylvain’s argument and its
implications. It would answer part of the question, “why,” and also go a
long way towards addressing why it matters that they are doing so.
Given how crucial the question of judicial deference is in the sphere of
administrative law questions, it seemed to be a tension with copyright
policy that the paper raised, and to which it ought to offer at least a tentative
answer. Perhaps there are robust policy reasons for expertise to play a
different-from-usual role in resolving legal questions raised by disruptive
technologies, or maybe there are countervailing reasons inherent in the
separation of powers, to define the scope of judicial power one way or the
other, for these issues of novel and disruptive communicative technologies.
These questions go beyond the scope of Sylvain’s article, yet they are
implicated by it, and may provide fruitful grounds for future analysis.
Finally, it is not entirely clear what effects were produced by courts’
skipping Chevron Step Zero: Is there a likelihood that the case would have
come out differently because following agency expertise here would have
produced a different outcome? Or is the problem largely theoretical, a
departure from procedure that could, in the future, have a significant effect,
but here mattered more as a matter of setting dangerous precedent? Sylvain
seems to imply that administrative pieces of the legal puzzle might have
resolved Aereo had they been put into play, and thus it would have been
interesting to hear even tentative thoughts about why these administrative
law questions remained sidelined, and what effects this absence produced.
Sylvain persuasively demonstrates that the regular course of deference
business was, effectively, disrupted.
IV. A PROCEDURALIST’S DEFENSE OF DEFERENCE
A further aspect of the article raised but not fully developed is the
jurisprudential philosophy Sylvain associates with the lack of deference he
has so convincingly diagnosed. For example, he critiques information law,
which he characterizes as “preoccup[ied] with finding the best positive

28. See id. at 724 (“The Justices and all of the federal judges who have heard the question . . .
chose to interpret the scope of the public performance right without any real consideration of the
agencies’ findings or reports on the question. I posit here that they did so based on the myopic
assumption that they alone have the duty of finding the proper balance between owners and
creators in the first instance” [that is, they must] “—or at least that they are as well situated as
anyone else to make legal sense of disruptive new technologies.” [that is, they may]).
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substantive outcome . . . that foster[s] innovation.” 29 It does not seem to
this author to be automatically problematic that one should seek to foster
innovation. Thus, what I take to be at issue for Sylvain is the
consequentialism that would prioritize innovation above all else, even when
redrawing substantive rights under copyright law. 30 For Sylvain, the more
pertinent questions relate to the proper scope of judicial deference to agency
expertise, and under that view, attending to outcomes instead of paying
attention to deference is thus a glaring oversight. 31 Yet in Sylvain’s
preference for procedural propriety and for respect of the separation of
powers, there are implicit jurisprudential values: proceduralism over
consequentialism, form over substance. While it bucks the contemporary
academy’s general approach to fly in the face of consequentialism, doing so
can stimulate a profound discussion of the proper balance between law and
technology, embedded in larger theories of democratic deliberation and the
separation of powers. Still, if it is accurate to characterize a good majority
of the academy—or at least intellectual property professors—as
consequentialist, it is perhaps also fair to say that there is an important role
for proceduralism and attention to formal justice. This may be an important
contribution from copyright’s intersection with administrative law; the
latter area is, of course, governed in the main by a statute that includes the
word “procedure” in its very title. 32 Aereo is an important case because it
offers the Supreme Court’s first pass at the public performance right, and its
latest pass on the scope of disruptive technologies’ impact on the laws of
broadcasting and copyright. Yet it is surely also important for calling our
attention to the importance of philosophies of law to understanding not just
legal reasoning but legal outcomes. Sylvain does a nice job of bringing
Aereo’s importance in numerous areas to light.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Sylvain has written an engaging article full of contributions
in a few related areas of law, and what he loses in doctrinal depth in a single
area he more than makes up in the beneficial breadth of his comparative
approach. Moreover, his syncretic approach across these three areas of law
reflects the rare competence required fully to grasp contemporary media
policy: More scholars ought to be attempting to cross these substantive
29. Id. at 736.
30. See id. at 737 (“The overwhelming focus on substantive policy outcomes ignores the far
more pertinent question today of how courts ought to make legal sense of laws when technologies
change and prevailing public law objectives are in tension.”).
31. Id. at 737–38.
32. Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012).
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boundaries to take in the entire picture. By drawing on insights from
administrative law, and its telling absence as both a procedural and a
substantive factor in the Aereo litigation, Sylvain offers a persuasive case
for more attention to procedural authority in judicial review, and a case—
though perhaps somewhat less persuasive—for greater judicial deference,
too. Aereo provides a case study of judicial functionalism in service of
achieving a particular outcome under copyright, an outcome in which
substance seems to have trumped—we might say disrupted?—the proper
scheme of judicial deference. Copyright’s outcome-myopia may serve a
particular, consequentialist vision of law suited to areas of (or developed in
response to) rapidly emerging technological development. But Sylvain’s
article shows us that copyright’s focus on outcomes leaves a great deal to be
desired when considered from the perspective of administrative law’s
prescription of a carefully negotiated balance of powers.

